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Abstract
Limited consumer attention limits product market competition: prices are stochastically lower the
more attention is paid. Ads compete to be the lowest price in a sector but compete for attention with
ads from other sectors: equilibrium ad shares follow a CES form. When a sector gets more proÞtable, its
advertising expands: others lose ad market share. The information hump shows highest ad levels for
intermediate attention levels. The Information Age takes oﬀ when the number of viable sectors grows,
but total ad volume reaches an upper limit. Overall, advertising is excessive, though the allocation across
sectors is optimal.
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1 Introduction
According to a Wiki cite, perhaps the Þrst academic to articulate the concept of attention economics was
Herbert Simon when he wrote
...in an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something else:
a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes is rather
obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a
poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention eﬃciently among the overabundance
of information sources that might consume it. (Simon 1971, p. 40-41).
This is echoed in Lanham (2006), in the idea that we are drowning in information, but short of the
attention to make sense of that information.1 Our interest in this paper is in turning around Simons
point and looking how restricted attention aﬀects the market information provided. In particular, we look
at competition between Þrms providing information in the form of ads for their products. Facing limited
attention, a Þrm might try and get away with a high price in the hope that its competitors ads about their
lower prices has been crowded out from the information receivers attention span. This leads us to consider
price dispersion in the face of endogenous congestion where information from each sector competes within
the sector and with each other sector (even though sectors do not directly compete except for attention). We
track several overall dimensions of the economics of information overload, advertising volume and clutter,
and price dispersion (some results are in the Abstract).
The Information Age has seen the means of reaching people increase enormously, with a correspond-
ing drop in the costs of doing so. In response, the amount of advertising has gone up drastically. Shenk
(1997) states that the average American encountered 560 daily advertising messages in 1971, and over
3,000 per day by 1997.2 At the same time though, consumer retention rates for ads remains low, perhaps
1See Eppler and Mengis (2004) for a multi-disciplinary review of Information Overload.
2Current exposure levels are a matter of considerable debate and estimates range from 245 through 5000 exposures a day: see
e.g. http://www.amic.com/guru/results.asp?words=media+exposure&submit=Search&op=AND Skeptics point out that one
would have to see an ad every 10 seconds for 8 hours to reach 3000 ads per day (although, in riposte, people are now spending
nine hours a day with media!). However, web-sites can easily include 10 ads, and by one estimate we view 2000 web-sites a
day. Likewise, commuting in a built-up area gives multiple bill-boards and signs per minute, not to mention the number of ads
per page in newspapers.
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one ad a day (the reader can ask himself or herself how many ads s/he remembers from yesterday!) Per-
haps not surprisingly, the costs of reaching prospective consumers is low, and varies from $6 CPM (cost
per thousand impressions) for Internet, through $18 for network TV and $26 for newspapers (for 2006,
http://www.wikinvest.com/concept/Impact_of_Internet_Advertising),3 and, of course, spam email is very
low cost. This picture of many messages relative to retention underscores our modeling approach.
The Information Age comes from several sources, primarily lower costs of sending information as more
(and cheaper) channels now reach potential consumers. Traditional billboards and newspaper ads have been
supplemented by Internet pop-ups, telemarketing, and product placements within TV programs (and on
football players jerseys). Information costs have not been lowered uniformly across the board, though, and
some sectors messages are more appropriately delivered by the new media. However, cheaper access to
attention also means that rivals can access attention more cheaply too, intensifying in-sector competition.
This eﬀect renders competition more acute, lowering prices and beneÞting consumers. Scarcity of attention
brings spillovers into other sectors, raising their prices and making it more likely interesting oﬀers are missed.
New product categories cause pricing churn for other advertised goods. A new product class depresses
existing classes ads relatively (as a fraction of the total volume of messages), and it drives down weaker ones
absolutely. Surprisingly, it may cause stronger sectors to increase in size because price competition is relaxed
(prices are stochastically higher). Thus there are information complementarities across product classes.
The third eﬀect we track is the attention span of consumers. Since both work and leisure time are spent
increasingly on information-carrying activities,4 it is likely that consumer attention spans (the amount of ads
that can be absorbed) have risen. This may induce more or less information transmission. When consumer
attention is sparse, little information will be sent because there is not much chance of getting a look-in.
Prices will be near monopoly levels because there is little chance of running across a rival. With a lot of
3Here are CPMs for 2002 (http://bpsoutdoor.com/article.php?article=how_eﬀective):
Billboard (30-Sheet Poster), $2.05; Radio Ad (During Prime Drive Time), $8.61; Magazine (One page with 4 colors), $9.35;
Television Commercial (30 Seconds on a Prime-Time Network), $17.78; Newspaper (1/3 of a page in black and white), $22.95.
4 Indeed: "While television is still by far the dominant medium in terms of the time average Americans spend daily with
media at 240.9 minutes, the computer has emerged as the second most signiÞcant media device at about 120 minutes." from
http://www.marketingvox.com/study_most_waking_hours_spent_with_media-020005/ who also say: "The average person
spends about nine hours a day using some type of media, which is arguably in excess of anything we would have envisioned 10
years ago."
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attention, not much information is sent because there is a good chance the consumer will get a better oﬀer
from the same sector. Prices will be low, so the beneÞt from sending a message is low. The middle ground
- the information hump - is the fertile ground for messages, yielding a fair shot at making a sale at a
reasonably high price, both by being seen but no rival from the same sector being found.
We also track the distribution of messages across sectors. With low levels of attention, highly proÞtable
sectors will be most prominently represented. Increasing consumer attention brings Þrms into more com-
petition with each other, which drives down sector proÞtability and serves to equalize opportunities across
sectors while generally lowering mark-ups. Improved communication costs in speciÞc sectors lower prices
there, though the extra crowding can relax competition (and raise prices) in other sectors.
The framework we use to model Þrms actions is adapted from Butters (1977) seminal work on informative
advertising, which is remarkable for delivering a tractable and intuitive description of equilibrium price
dispersion. Butters derives a density of advertised prices and sales prices; he proposes a monopolistic
competition framework distinct from that of Chamberlin (1933). In both the Butters and Chamberlinian
formulations of monopolistic competition, the competitive part comes from a free-entry zero proÞt condition
that closes the model. The monopolist part in Chamberlins work comes from heterogeneity of the products
sold by Þrms; in Butters it comes from the market power that Þrms have due to imperfect information that
consumers do not know all Þrms prices.
We meld Butters approach with the advertising clutter approach formalized in Van Zandt (2005) and
Anderson and de Palma (2009). Reception of messages is passive: the consumer does not search. This
contrasts with Baye and Morgan (2001, 2002) who consider active consumers choosing whether to visit a price
comparison site, and a gatekeeper Þrm charging access fees (with a single product sector which generates
price dispersion from a mixed strategy equilibrium). Our context corresponds to passively getting messages
from bulk mail, from the television, from billboards, etc. We focus on the interaction of multiple industries
competing for individuals attention. While Butters generates price dispersion because each individual gets
only a subset of the price messages (likewise Baye and Morgan, 2001, insofar as Þrms play with positive
probability the option of not posting a price on the comparison site), we suppose that the individual misses
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some of the messages sent. This reßects advertising clutter because an individual is bombarded by too many
messages (in junk mail, billboards, television, and internet pop-ups) to pay full attention to all.
Several authors model both the consumers choice of how much attention to supply and the actions of
Þrms vying for that attention by sending messages advertising their wares. In Falkinger (2008), consumers
can choose how tight to make message Þlters but have a limited attention capacity. In Anderson and de Palma
(2009), consumers have congested attention spans because they choose how many messages to examine. In
Johnson (2010), consumers choose whether to examine all messages or to block them all.
A common feature of these models is that the consumers attention is a common property resource
insofar as a message sender ignores the eﬀects of its own message on other senders. This means there is a
congestion externality, and a tax on messages can improve the allocation of resources.5 One concern with this
conclusion is that direct business-stealing eﬀects are closed down: message senders do not compete directly in
the marketplace, they just compete for attention. A tax might a priori reduce price competition by reducing
message volume, and so harm consumer welfare. We investigate this question by speciÞcally modeling
competition within each of several sectors vying for consumer attention. The focus on Þrm competition
necessitates simplifying the consumer side of the model: it is assumed here the consumers attention span is
Þxed outside the model.
We Þrst characterize an equilibrium model with interaction both within and across sectors. Competition
within a sector means that a lower price is more likely to be the lowest sector oﬀer in the set of messages
the consumer has screened. Nonetheless, higher-price senders can remain in equilibrium: there is a trade-oﬀ
between sales probability and mark-up, so all can earn zero proÞts despite price dispersion. Competition
among sectors (industries) comes from overall competition for consumer attention, and price dispersion in
each sector depends on all other active sectors.
Surprisingly, the model endogenously generates an inverse IIA property for sector message fractions, and
a CES form for the total number of messages sent. This bears an intriguing parallel to the CES utility
functional form so often used to parameterize Chamberlinian models. Information congestion gives a new
5However, if the consumers attention is not congested, a tax may worsen the allocation insofar as message senders do not
internalize the consumer surplus from contacting prospective clients.
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rationale for the CES speciÞcation, but it is now coupled with price dispersion within multiple sectors.
The model also generates a diﬀerent welfare prescription from Butters (1977). While Butters model has
the optimal and equilibrium level of information equal, we Þnd that the market allocation can be improved
by taxing messages.6 This reßects the property that advertising is excessive, in contrast to most of the
theoretical economics literature on the subject (see Bagwell, 2007, for a survey). Indeed, the standard
result in the economics of informative advertising is that there is not enough advertising because Þrms do
not capture the consumer surplus. This is the monopoly result (see Shapiro, 1981, for example). Under
oligopoly, this is somewhat oﬀset by business stealing: overadvertising arises in the Grossman and Shapiro
(1983) model of informative advertising when the business stealing eﬀect outweighs the consumer surplus
one.7 Along similar lines, Stegeman (1991) shows that the market advertising is insuﬃcient when the Butters
model is amended to allow demand to have some elasticity: Þrms then tend to overprice without suﬃcient
regard to the consumer surplus lost. In our context, over-advertising is quite natural as it dissipates rents.
The next Section describes the model and solution technique. Section 3 derives the CES form for total
advertising and characterizes message volume by sector. Section 4 Þnds the advertising and sales price
distributions by sector, and ties them into the earlier comparative static results. Section 5 sets out the
normative properties, the neutrality result that no real changes ensue from transmission cost changes, the
optimal allocation property, and the tax prescription to deal with over-advertising. Section 6 allows for
distractions, which break the neutrality result, but retain the basic CES form. Section 7 concludes. The
Appendix gives a quick reminder of the Butters (1977) model.
2 Message reception and transmission
2.1 Assumptions
There are
=
Θ potential commercial sectors, indexed by θ = 1, ...,
=
Θ. Each active sector θ comprises a continuum
of Þrms of mass nθ.8 Each active Þrm sends just one message per consumer at a cost γθ (which can represent
6This Þnding reinforces the conclusion of Anderson and de Palma (2009) of the desirability of a tax on transmission in the
presence of congestion.
7Excessive advertising is also found in the controversial Dixit and Norman (1978) paper on persuasive advertising.
8 In Section 3.4 we discuss how these sectors are endogenously determined.
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the cost of a letter, or the cost of a billboard divided by the number of consumers reached).9 A message is
an (ex-ante anonymous) advertisement containing the price at which a consumer can buy the product from
the sending Þrm. Firms within each sector produce homogenous goods, and each sector therefore transmits
nθ messages, for a total number of N =
X=Θ
θ=1
nθ messages (per consumer). The cost of producing the good
advertised in the message is cθ (which is only incurred if the good is bought  think of a pizza for example):
if the good must be produced beforehand regardless of whether the consumer buys, it suﬃces to set cθ = 0
and fold the production cost into the transmission cost, γθ.
Consumers are assumed to be identical. Messages could be sent to them by bulk mail, by email, or they
could be posted on billboards, or on TV programs. However, reaching a consumer does not mean the message
is registered. Each consumer has the same probability of registering a message (which means retaining the
price oﬀer). Since we assume constant returns to scale in production (constant marginal costs), we can treat
the consumer as the unit of analysis and so we henceforth refer to a single consumer.10
The consumer registers a Þxed number of messages, φ ≥ 1, which are drawn at random from the N
messages sent. This reßects limited information processing capability. In what follows we will assume that
not all messages sent are registered (φ < N) in order to capture advertising clutter / information congestion:
this condition will hold in equilibrium under a mild assumption that ensures there are always some inactive
potential sectors. After registering the φ messages, the consumer makes her purchase decisions. She chooses
the lowest priced oﬀer received from each sector (we argue below that the probability of ties is zero) and
buys qθ units if that price is no larger than her reservation price for the sector, bθ.
The model can also be interpreted as competition with traditional physical stores as follows. A consumer
can buy a product in a store, or else she can receive an ad enabling her to buy it cheaper. For advertisers,
her reservation price, bθ, is the full price paid at the store. This full price will include her transportation
costs, etc. The consumer may receive unsolicited ads from other sellers; to be entertained they must be
priced below her reservation price. Assume that traditional stores are competitive so that the store price is
9 Indeed, in equilibrium no sender would want to send a second message: to do so would give a negative proÞt given the
original message just made a zero proÞt under the free-entry assumption below.
10Allowing for multiple consumer types would be useful for extending the model to analyze consumer targeting.
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at the sum of marginal production plus distribution costs. Other sellers may have lower distribution costs
(think bricks vs. clicks), and they might deliver the product more cheaply. Assume that consumers do not
search out sellers, but they do know about the store option.
Clearly, both types of goods can coexist  some products are available both in stores and through
advertised oﬀers; others are not available in stores. The model allows for this by judicious interpretation
of the reservation price. In both cases, if an advertised oﬀer is accepted at price p, the consumer surplus
ascribed to the advertising sector is bθ − p.
Finally, we assume that the number of Þrms in each sector (and the density of messages in a sector at
any advertised price) is determined by a zero-proÞt (free-entry) condition.
2.2 Solution technique
A Þrms expected demand (at any price it may charge) is the probability that its message is registered and it
is the lowest price received from its sector. Its expected demand also must satisfy the zero proÞt condition for
the price charged. We equate the probability of making a sale at a particular price from these two diﬀerent
angles to Þnd the relation between the price and the advertised price distribution.11
The highest price set by any Þrm, bθ, plays a key role because the only way the sender can avoid a loss
at such a price is if it is the only message drawn from that sector. This ties down the number of messages
nθ sent from sector θ as a fraction of the total number of messages sent, N . Summing over sectors yields the
total number sent, N , from which we can back out the number in each sector (the nθs). Armed with that
statistic, we can recover the equilibrium price distribution in each sector and its support. This technique
also enables us to determine endogenously the equilibrium number of active sectors.
More formally, an equilibrium to the model maps the primitives
µ
φ,
½
bθ, cθ, qθ, γθ; θ = 1, ...,
=
Θ
¾¶
into a
set of non-negative sector message numbers
³
n1, ..., n=
Θ
´
, which sum to the total message volume N . A sector
is active if and only if nθ > 0. For each active sector, the equilibrium speciÞes sector purchase probabilities,
11An alternative interpretation is to assume a Þnite number of Þrms per sector (see Baye and Morgan, 2001, for a related
analysis with a single sector and a gatekeeper). At a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium conditional on the number of
Þrms entering, all prices played must yield the same proÞt level. Appending a prior entry game implies that the equilibrium
proÞt level is zero. We have preferred to follow the Butters description with a continuum of Þrms, not least because the choice
probabilities we use are exact (see (1) and the discussion below).
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Pθ, for the consumer, a price distribution within each sector, and corresponding choice probabilities for
each product P (p, θ). We show that equilibrium is unique, with an endogenous cut-oﬀ between active and
inactive sectors. We proceed in Lemma 2 by determining message volume by sector as a function of the total
message volume, N (to be determined later). We then sum over active sectors in Proposition 5, to Þnd the
N consistent with a given number of active sectors. Then, in Proposition 6 we identify the active sectors.
Intermediate results describe properties of the solutions.
2.3 Message selection probability
We Þrst seek the probability that a particular message is the only one registered from a sector. Assume
that nθ < N , so at least two sectors are active.12 Given there is a total mass of N messages, and a Þnite
number of draws, the probability of drawing any given message on a given draw is 1N . It is independent of
which draw we consider, since the mass of messages left does not noticeably fall with the number of messages
already drawn, so the probability of drawing the message is φN . By the same token, the mass of Þrms in
sector θ is nθ < N , so that the probability of drawing a message from a competitor in the same sector is nθN .
Hence the probability of avoiding all competitors in the same sector is the probability that no message from
the sector is drawn on the other φ− 1 draws, namely ¡1− nθN ¢φ−1. Then
Pθ =
φ
N
³
1− nθ
N
´φ−1
(1)
is the probability that one (speciÞc) message from sector θ is registered,13 and no other message is registered
from that sector.14
12As will be seen later, this will be true under mild conditions.
13We will later use the notation P (p, θ) to denote the probability of a sale at price p in sector θ: hence Pθ = P (bθ, θ), since
we shall show that a sale at the top price sent, bθ, only happens when the message is the only one drawn from the sector.
14This formula can also be derived as an approximation for a Þnite number of Þrms. Suppose that search is with replacement.
Then the probability of getting the message on the Þrst draw, and missing the rest of the sector on all subsequent draws is
1
N
³
1− nθ−1
N
´φ−1
. The probability of missing the whole sector on the Þrst k− 1 draws, drawing the message on the kth draw
and missing the rest of the sector subsequently is
¡
1− nθ
N
¢k−1 1
N
³
1− nθ−1
N
´φ−k
. Thus the chance of getting the message alone
is the sum of these events, namely
k=φX
k=1
¡
1− nθ
N
¢k−1 1
N
³
1− nθ−1
N
´φ−k
. This sum simpliÞes to
³
1− nθ−1
N
´φ−¡1− nθ
N
¢φ. The
Þrst-order Taylor approximation to the Þrst term,
³
1− nθ−1
N
´φ
, is
¡
1− nθ
N
¢φ
+ 1
N
φ
¡
1− nθ
N
¢φ−1, and so, to the Þrst-order,
Pθ is 1N φ
¡
1− nθ
N
¢φ−1, which is the expression given in the text.
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2.4 Price distribution
Recall that each Þrm chooses a single price, and there is a continuum of Þrms in each sector. There can be
no equilibrium with all Þrms choosing the same price (and hence sharing the market): a common price above
cθ + γθ/qθ could be proÞtably undercut; any price cθ + γθ/qθ or below would give negative proÞts.
We Þrst argue that the support of the equilibrium advertised price distribution (for any Þrm in active
sector θ) is a compact interval
£
pθ, bθ
¤
with no atoms nor gaps, where the lower bound, pθ, is to be determined
below. There are no atoms in the price distribution because if there were, any sender choosing the same
price as a mass of other senders would raise proÞts by inÞnitesimally cutting its price. This would leave its
mark-up essentially unchanged but raise sales discretely because it then beats all others at the purported
mass point whenever two lowest price messages were the same. The interval has no gaps on the support
because if there were, the lower price at a gap can be raised leaving the sales probability unchanged but
increasing the mark-up. This same argument implies the support must go up to bθ: if it stopped short,
the highest price Þrm could raise its price with no penalty on sales probability and increase its mark-up.
Finally, the lower bound of the support must exceed cθ + γθ/qθ because at any lower price the transmission
cost cannot be recouped. It must strictly exceed this bound because there is a positive probability that the
message is not read (contrast Butters).
Lemma 1 Prices in industry θ are distributed on a compact support
£
pθ, bθ
¤
where pθ > cθ + γθ/qθ, and
there are no atoms.
Let F (p, θ) denote the fraction of messages in sector θ sent at price p or below. (Then F
¡
pθ, θ
¢
= 0 and
F (bθ, θ) = 1). A message at price p is successful as long as the price is the lowest one received: using the
same logic as used to derive (1), the sales probability is
P (p, θ)=
φ
N
µ
1− nθF (p, θ)
N
¶φ−1
, (2)
where we simply note that nθF (p, θ) is the number of messages sent from the sector with a price below p.
We proceed in Section 3 by determining aggregate numbers of messages per sector and total messages,
and in Section 4 we derive the price distribution for each sector.
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3 Advertising levels
3.1 Advertising shares by sector
We have just argued that some Þrms will send out an ad at a price equal to the reservation price bθ, and
the probability of Þnding a second ad at the same price is zero. So consider an advertisement which is sent
out with price bθ. Since Pθ (as given by (1)) is the probability this is the only ad found from sector θ, the
equilibrium zero proÞt condition (which will tie down nθ) reads:
(bθ − cθ) qθPθ = γθ, (3)
where we recall that qθ is the quantity of good θ demanded. DeÞne πθ by:
πθ =
(bθ − cθ) qθ
γθ
,
which measures the economic performance (social surplus per $ transmission cost) of sector θ. It is necessary
(but not suﬃcient) for an active sector that πθ > 1 because (bθ − cθ) qθ must exceed γθ in order for the
sender to incur the cost of a message, given that messages are not read with certainty. Indeed, if πθ ≤ Nφ ,
then even a single message sent from sector θ at the highest price would not be expected to cover its costs:
i.e.,
(bθ − cθ) qθ φ
N
≤ γθ , (4)
where φN is the probability the message is registered.
15 The zero proÞt condition (3) for the equilibrium
probability the highest-priced sender in active sector θ makes a sale is then
Pθ =
1
πθ
. (5)
This probability depends only on the intrinsic economic performance index, πθ, of the sector.
Let Θ¯ ∈ (1,
=
Θ] be the number of sectors for which πθ > 1: this is the maximum number of active
sectors.16 We rank these sectors such that πθ is decreasing in the index θ, i.e. from highest to lowest
15As we shall see below, this is also the condition for the lowest price in the price support to be below bθ. (For the lowest
price, γθ equals the mark-up times the probability of being drawn. The latter is φ/N since a sale is guaranteed for the lowest
price in the sector, conditional on being drawn. Since the critical value of the low price is bθ, the condition follows immediately.)
16The model is degenerate if there is a single sector. From (9), there are zero messages. This could rather be interpreted
as a single Þrm setting the monopoly price in one message: any other entrant rationally anticipates negative proÞt if it enters
(messages from rivals are necessarily read, so price would go to marginal cost if there is more than one Þrm, so losses ensue).
Section 6, by introducing an "outside" option, allows for a non-degenerate outcome with one active sector.
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economic performance. For simplicity (except when we do the symmetric analysis) we will assume that all
the πθs are diﬀerent across sectors. In the sequel, we will Þnd the endogenous number of active sectors.17
Lemma 2 Let N > φ. All sectors θ such that πθ > Nφ are active sectors, and the rest are inactive. The
relative sector sizes are
nθ
N
= max
(
1−
µ
N
φ
1
πθ
¶ 1
φ−1
, 0
)
, θ = 1, ..., Θ¯. (6)
Proof. Equating the probability derived from the zero-proÞt condition, (5), with the probability that she
gets no other message from the sector, (1), implies Pθ = φN
¡
1− nθN
¢φ−1
= 1πθ , and so determines the ad
market shares by rewriting this as (6). Hence, sector θ sends a positive number of messages if and only if
πθ >
N
φ .
We defer considering the overall comparative static properties of equilibrium because N is still to be
determined in (6). However, we can use the expression to compare across sectors of diﬀerent economic
characteristics within an equilibrium. Sectors with larger economic performance send more messages because
they are more attractive to senders. That is, nθ > nθ0 if and only if πθ > πθ0 . We proceed by further
characterizing the relation that sector sizes must satisfy at any equilibrium.
3.2 The inverse IIA property
Sector message sizes exhibit a type of IIA property (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) in the sense
that the ratio of ad market shares of two sectors depends only on their proÞtabilities for a given N . However,
contrary to the usual IIA property (Þrst pointed out by Debreu (1960) in his critique of Luces (1959) Choice
Axiom), which stipulates that the ratio of market shares does not change with the number and type of other
options, this ratio does change here since N changes with the proÞtability of a third sector (see also (9)
below). Thus, the standard IIA property does not hold for this model. However, a related IIA property
holds, with respect to the market shares of all competing sectors. We call this the inverse IIA property,
17As we show below, there will be at least 2 sectors under the mild condition that π2 > 1.
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which pertains to the ratios m−θ ≡ N−nθN . From (6), the inverse IIA property is:18
m−θ
m−θ0
=
µ
πθ0
πθ
¶ 1
φ−1
for all θ = 1, ..., Θ, (7)
where Θ is the number of active sectors. This is a property of invariance of the ratio of all rivals advertising
levels as the appeal of any rival (outside the pair) changes. Analogously to the way the IIA property implies
the Logit model (see Luce, 1959), the inverse IIA property implies an inverse Logit formulation:
Proposition 3 At any equilibrium with Θ active sectors, the non-θ shares have a logit form:
m−θ³
Θ− 1
´ = π −1φ−1θXΘ
θ0=1
π
−1
φ−1
θ0
≡ Ψθ, θ = 1, ..., Θ, (8)
where the LHS is the non-share of sector θ over the total non-share of all sectors.
Proof. Inverting (7),
m−θ0
m−θ
=
µ
πθ
πθ0
¶ 1
φ−1
.
Summing over θ0 gives (
Θ−1)
m−θ
= (πθ)
1
φ−1
XΘ
θ0=1
π
− 1φ−1
θ0 , and the result follows directly by inversion.
The value of Θ is endogenous here (and is determined below). Only the active sectors are counted:
inactive sectors πθ are excluded from the summation. The same caveat applies below.
As πθ increases, the RHS of (8) falls: as the proÞtability of a sector rises, it produces proportionately
more ads while the others produce relatively less. Even a mature sector may enjoy a higher proÞtability if
γθ falls, perhaps because of the advent of a new medium which might complement advertising its goods and
get larger ad market shares which come at the expense of the others.19 Indeed, as shown in sections 3.4 and
3.5, weak sectors might be pushed out of the market entirely. The eﬀects of raising φ on the distribution of
messages by sector are fundamentally those of the logit formulation (see for example Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse (1992)), though the derivation of that form above diﬀers from the usual roots.
18Therefore nθ
nθ0
=
1−(Θ−1)Ψθ
1−(Θ−1)Ψθ0
, which indicates that IIA does not hold, where Ψθ is deÞned below in (8).
19We see in Section 3.5 that the number of ads from sector θ0 may actually rise if that sector is suﬃciently attractive.
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Proposition 4 For Θ > 1 constant, as φ rises, the ad market share of the most proÞtable sector decreases
with φ, and the share of the least proÞtable sector increases. As φ falls to 1, almost all messages are sent by
the most proÞtable sector.
Proof. To show the Þrst point, Þx Θ > 1. The relation in (8) gives the fraction of messages in sector θ as
nθ
N = 1−
³
Θ− 1
´
Ψθ. Note that
dπ
−1
φ−1
θ
dφ = −
π
−1
φ−1
θ
(φ−1)2 ln
1
πθ
, so that
dΨθ
dφ
s
= − ln 1
πθ
+
XΘ
θ0=1
Ψθ0 ln
1
πθ0
,
(where the symbol s= denotes that the derivative has the sign of the expression), or (since
XΘ
θ0=1
Ψθ0 = 1),
dΨθ
dφ
s
=
XΘ
θ0=1
Ψθ0
µ
ln
1
πθ0
− ln 1
πθ
¶
.
Hence, the share decreases with φ for the most proÞtable sector (1), and increases for the least proÞtable
one (Θ). Finally, note from (8) that
Ψ1 =
π
−1
φ−1
1XΘ
θ=1
π
−1
φ−1
θ
=
1
1 +
XΘ
θ=2
³
π1
πθ
´ 1
φ−1
.
Hence, lim
φ↓1
Ψ1 = 0: almost all messages are sent from sector 1.
If the attention span is very limited (φ close to 1), virtually all messages are from the highest proÞt sector,
1, because this yields the greatest proÞt conditional on making the hit. The messages sent tend to quote
the monopoly price because there is almost no chance of being undercut by another message. Monopoly
prices are most attractive for the sector with the highest monopoly proÞt. The number of messages sent
from this sector tends to π1.20 This corresponds to pure dissipation of the monopoly proÞt in sector 1. It is
possible that there is a huge number of such messages if π1 is very high: even if π2 is high too (but strictly
below π1), it attracts virtually no messages. This case arises if the transmission cost for one sector tends
to zero while the other sectors retain positive costs: the sector crowds out all other sectors. This is clearly
wasteful because all other sectors are closed out, while the aﬀected sector just dissipates all the rents in
excessive message transmission.21
20This can be seen as follows. If N messages are sent, all from sector 1, and one is drawn, then monopoly pricing implies the
proÞt from a message is b1−c1
N
q1 − γ1. The zero proÞt condition implies the number of messages is π1.
21As we shall see below, if all sector transmission costs fall proportionately, the range of prices stays the same in each sector:
the density of messages sent at any price simple rises proportionately (to the cost decrease) for all sectors.
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At the other extreme, when the attention span is extensive, any price above the lowest in the sector will
almost certainly be beaten. All sectors are very competitive, so sectors become equally (un)attractive: a lot
of price competition means very few messages per sector.
When Θ > 2, the advertising shares of the intermediate sectors are not necessarily monotonic in the
level of consumer attention, φ. To see this, consider 3 sectors. Sectors 1 and 2 have very high proÞts, with
2 slightly less than 1, while sector 3 has very low proÞt. When the attention span is slightly above one
message, sector 1 is active while 2 is virtually silent. For middling values of φ, both 1 and 2 have almost half
the market each. For φ large, all have around one third shares. Sector 2s share is not monotonic here.
Expression (8) in turn gives rise to a familiar functional form.
3.3 Aggregate advertising
The next step is to determine the equilibrium message volume, N . Expressions (6) and (8) give two diﬀerent
expressions for m−i. Equating them yields:22
Proposition 5 The equilibrium total message size given Θ > 1 active sectors and N > φ takes a CES form:
N = φ
³
Θ− 1
´φ−1µXΘ
θ=1
π
−1
φ−1
θ
¶−(φ−1)
. (9)
Thus N is increasing in each proÞtability, πθ, and homogenous of degree one in the sector proÞtabilities.
Adding another viable sector raises N .
Proof. The properties are straightforward except for the last one. Consider introducing a barely viable
sector s with ns = 0: by (6), the corresponding performance of such a new sector s is πs = N/φ. We now
verify that introducing this barely viable sector s leaves (9) unchanged:
N
φ
=
³
Θ− 1
´φ−1
µXΘ
θ0=1
π
−1
φ−1
θ0
¶φ−1 =
³
Θ
´φ−1
µXΘ
θ0=1
π
−1
φ−1
θ0 +
³
N
φ
´ −1
φ−1
¶φ−1 .
Thence, by continuity, introducing a strictly viable sector, with πs > N/φ, will cause N to increase even if
some sectors exit.
22N can also be derived from summing up the expressions for market shares in (6).
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The CES form has well-known properties.23 Raising the proÞtability of any sector causes the total volume
of messages to rise because the extra clamor causes a larger total without a fully compensating backlash
from the other sectors.
3.4 Sector viability
When sectors are asymmetric, some may be precluded by the strength of those in the market. We determine
the equilibrium set of active sectors. Recall that Θ¯ denotes the number of sectors for which πθ > 1 (any
sector with πθ ≤ 1 is not viable, and so can be eliminated from the discussion). Furthermore, deÞne Θ by
π Θ+1 ≤
³
Θ− 1
´φ−1µXΘ
θ0=1
π
−1
φ−1
θ0
¶−(φ−1)
< π Θ (10)
and assume that Θ ∈ ¡1, Θ¯¢. As we show, this means that there will be some sectors (all those with index
above Θ) which do not advertise, and the existence of such sectors implies that the congestion condition
N > φ necessarily holds.24
Proposition 6 Assume that Θ ∈ ¡1, Θ¯¢ as deÞned by (10). Then there exists a unique equilibrium: sectors
1, ..., Θ are active, and the total volume of messages is given by (9).
Proof. From Lemma 2, a sector is active in equilibrium if πθ >
NΘ
φ , where NΘ denotes the number of
messages for Θ active sectors as given by (9). Next, we show there is a unique cut-oﬀ between active and
inactive sectors. The condition for a sector to be active is πθ >
NΘ
φ . Given the ranking of sectors, the LHS
decreases in the marginal sector, Θ, while we showed in Proposition 5 that the RHS increases as sectors are
added. Thus there is a unique solution for Θ, and it is given by (10), where the term in the middle is NΘφ
(see (9)). Notice that necessarily the congestion condition holds: NΘ > φ since
NΘ
φ > π Θ+1 > 1 by (10).
It remains to show that the equilibrium follows the ranking: there cannot be an equilibrium with some
sector θ excluded while some sector θ0 > θ is included. If there were, then the proÞt from sending a single
message from sector θ (at its monopoly price, bθ) is πθ
φ
N . However, messages sent from sector θ
0 return a
23For example, it is maximal at symmetry (under the constraint that the sum of the inverse πθs is constant).
24 If all potential sectors are active, we get into a corner solution where the condition N > φ does not necessarily hold. If
the model returns a solution with N < φ, it contradicts the congested formula used in setting up the choice probabilities. The
existence of some latent sectors is enough to avoid that.
15
proÞt of at most πθ0
φ
N . Hence, since πθ > πθ0 , a message from sector θ would supplant one from sector θ
0,
so the starting point cannot be an equilibrium.25
Viability constraints imply that equilibrium congestion across sectors may close down a sector when
another sector becomes more attractive. Similarly, a newly entering or improved sector raises the congestion
on the incumbents. This we illustrate next.
3.5 Raising a sectors proÞtability
Proposition 5 shows that an increase in a sectors proÞtability will increase the total number of messages
sent (even if this causes exit of other sectors). Since the other sectors all send smaller shares of this larger
total, the aﬀected sector must send more messages. We now determine what happens to the other sectors.
Recall nθN = 1−
³
N
φ
1
πθ
´ 1
φ−1
from (6). Hence for an unaﬀected sector (where πθ has not changed) it is clear
that the sector share goes down. However, it is possible the number of messages it transmits goes up, as
we now show (that is, we show that dnθdπθ0 can be positive). Indeed,
dnθ
dπθ0
= dnθdN
dN
dπθ0
has the sign of dnθdN since
dN
dπθ0
> 0. From (6), we have the derivative26
dnθ
dN
= 1− φ
φ− 1
µ
N
φ
1
πθ
¶ 1
φ−1
.
Substituting Nφ from (9) and deÞning χθ = π
−1
φ−1
θ and χ¯ as the average value of χθ, gives
dnθ
dN
= 1− φ
φ− 1
³
Θ− 1
´
Θ
χθ
χ¯
, (11)
From a symmetric starting point (where χθ = χ¯ for all θ ≤ Θ), dnθdN has the sign of 1− φφ−1
(Θ−1)
Θ
, which is
negative if and only if φ > Θ. If though φ < Θ, a marginally higher attractivity in one sector causes message
numbers to rise in all sectors. This result is broadly consistent with the rising part of the information hump
(low φ) and for the early "take-oﬀ" part of the Information Age evolution depicted in Figure 1 below. There
is a relatively large increase in the number of messages sent as long as the amount of competition is small.
In the asymmetric case, (11) indicates that there is a cut-oﬀ value of χθ for which
dnθ
dN is negative for
higher χθ and positive for lower χθ. Since πθ is inversely related to χθ, this means that larger sectors are
25 If there are several sectors with the same proÞtability, then they are either all active or all inactive.
26From which we see that higher πθ0 increases the likelihood that the expression is positive.
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more likely to see an increase in the number of messages sent. A summary Proposition:
Proposition 7 The equilibrium total message volume increases as any sector becomes more proÞtable. The
improved sector sends more messages both relatively and absolutely. All other sectors diminish in relative
importance, but suﬃciently proÞtable sectors may increase in absolute size.
It may seem surprising that some sectors could increase in size despite more competition and even though
sectors are linked only through the negative eﬀects of congestion (there are no demand complementarities,
for example). The favored sector increases in size. This has two contradictory eﬀects on other sectors. First,
any given message is less likely to be found. However, any rivals message is also less likely to be found.
The Þrst eﬀect impacts all industries equally. The second favors the larger industries because each Þrm has
more competition, so these industries will attract new entry.
3.6 The Information Age
The key driver of the information age is lower communication costs. The homogeneity property of the CES
function for N in Proposition 5 implies that total message volume doubles if all communication costs are
halved.27 This is one obvious cause of a surfeit of information: spam email is an everyday manifestation
of the problem. Any such cost improvement is oﬀset by the rise in messages sent, so all improvements are
completely dissipated.28 As we show in the next Section, price dispersion also remains unaltered, and this
leads to the neutrality result given in Proposition 14 that welfare remains unchanged.
However, even though a uniform cost reduction does not cause new sectors to enter, improved commu-
nication may help some sectors more than others, insofar as some are better suited to having their ads
embedded in the new media. This leads us to now consider a larger set of viable sectors. The exercise can
be thought of as cost reductions in hitherto excluded sectors (or, indeed, as new product classes, like PCs
and software, coming to market).
27No further sectors will enter, since doubling of the existing message volume will preclude them, even if their transmission
costs halve. Indeed, as we just noted, a sector is viable if and only if πs > N/φ.
28This is reminiscent of Zahavis Law in transportation, according to which average travel times have remained constant over
several decades, despite substantial increases in travel speed.
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We consider the symmetric case before returning in the next Section to the asymmetric one. For the
symmetric analysis, we will assume that all Θ¯ potential sectors are active.29 Then, with πθ = π > 1 for all
θ = 1, ..., Θ¯, the expression (from (9)) for the total number of messages, N , reduces to30
N = φ
µ
Θ¯− 1
Θ¯
¶φ−1
π. (12)
Having more sectors, Θ¯, raises the total number of messages. The number N is a logistic function of the
number of sectors: it is Þrst convex (for Θ¯ < φ/2 ), and then concave, for Θ¯ > φ/2. If we were to view the
number of (new) sectors as arriving at a constant rate, then this means the amount of information would
accelerate at Þrst (the take-oﬀ of the Information Age) before tapering oﬀ, reminiscent of the Bass (1969)
diﬀusion of innovation model. Indeed, the amount of information has an asymptote of N¯ = φπ, which is the
bound to the amount of information the system can sustain.31
10080604020
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200
150
100
50
Theta
N
Figure 1. Total messages as a function of the number of active sectors.
The average number of messages per sector, nθ = N/Θ¯, is increasing in Θ¯ if and only if φ > Θ¯, so it is
29We then need to verify that the condition N > φ is veriÞed with Θ¯ sectors: this is duly met in the Figures below.
30 Symmetric CES models are commonly deployed in the economics of product diﬀerentiation. Note here that the sector
viability constraint, π > N/φ, is automatically satisÞed.
31At the limit, monopoly prices, b, are set in each sector, returning π when the message is chosen. The probability of being
chosen is φ/N¯ , which therefore equals 1/π (see also (5)).
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eventually decreasing (for Θ¯ large enough). The initial increase is explained by the idea that more sectors
mean less competition, so higher prices and more incentive to send messages. The logistic function in (12)
is sketched in Figure 1, for π = 20 and φ = 20 (the function asymptotes to N = 400, the maximal value of
N/Θ¯ is attained at Θ¯ = 20, and the inßection point is at Θ¯ = 10). The other comparative static property of
N , with respect to φ, is described next.
3.7 The information overßow hump
The advent of new media means more consumer time is now spent with ad-carrying activities, like surÞng
the internet or sending email. This likely implies an increase in the overall consumer attention span as more
hours are spent on media. The thumbnail capture in the model of this increased span is to raise φ.
From the symmetric analysis (see (12)), we can see that the information level, N , is decreasing in the
attention span, φ if and only if φ > φ ≡ 1µ
ln Θ¯
(Θ¯−1)
¶ , and so N is necessarily decreasing for φ > Θ¯ (since
Θ¯ ln Θ¯
(Θ¯−1) > 1: the LHS is decreasing in Θ¯ and goes to 1 as Θ¯ goes to inÞnity). Likewise,
N
φ is falling in φ,
and therefore N increases more slowly than φ.
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Figure 2. Total number of messages sent, N , as a function of attention span, φ ≥ 1.
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Figure 2 plots the relation of N as a function of φ for π = 100 and Θ¯ = 10 (hence N = 100φ
¡
9
10
¢φ−1
attains its maximum at φ = 1
(ln 109 )
, which is slightly less than 10). The dashed line is the line φ = N . Figure
2 shows the quasi-concave function, i.e., Þrst increasing, then decreasing with the attention span, φ. This we
term the information overßow hump. However, the number of messages only increases for low φ < φ (< Θ¯).
More attention has two conßicting consequences. First, it raises the probability a message from the sector is
seen, which raises proÞtability, and hence the number of messages sent, ceteris paribus. But it also has the
eﬀect of increasing price competition (the price distribution shifts down), as it is more likely a lower price
will be found in the sector. This reduces proÞtability and leads to a smaller number of Þrms (messages).
For low φ, the price competition eﬀect is weak in that it is quite unlikely that another message received will
be from the same sector as one already received: extra messages will most likely come from unrepresented
sectors. With high reception rates, the price eﬀect dominates. In a nutshell, for low φ and given Θ¯, more
examination leads to more messages sent as undiscovered sectors become more likely to be found. For higher
φ, more examination means more hits in the same sector, which increases price competition and so decreases
sector activity.
We now turn to the price distribution, whose properties underpin the economics of the results so far.
4 Equilibrium price dispersion
The equilibrium sales probability corresponding to a particular price p in sector θ can be determined inde-
pendently of the other sectors. However, we need to bring in the other sectors to determine which prices are
actually used in equilibrium. The equilibrium sales probability for a message announcing price p in sector
θ, P (p, θ), is given simply from the zero-proÞt condition as
P (p, θ)=
γθ
(p− cθ) qθ =
(bθ − cθ)
(p− cθ)
1
πθ
, (13)
where P (p, θ) ∈ (0, 1) for all p in the interior of the support of the equilibrium price distribution. The above
expression reduces to the zero-proÞt condition (5), when p = bθ, and using the notation P (bθ, θ) = Pθ.
The equilibrium sales probability above is decreasing and convex in p. We next want to use it to determine
20
the equilibrium advertised price distribution. This is done by equating P (p, θ) in the zero proÞt condition
(13) to the expression given in (2) for the probability of there being no lower price drawn, which gives
(bθ − cθ)
(p− cθ)
1
πθ
=
φ
N
µ
1− nθF (p, θ)
N
¶φ−1
, (14)
where nθ/N is given by (6).
Proposition 8 The equilibrium advertised price density in sector θ is decreasing and convex on
£
pθ, bθ
¤
,
with (truncated) Pareto distribution
F (p, θ)=
1−
³
N
φπθ
´ 1
φ−1
³
bθ−cθ
p−cθ
´ 1
φ−1
1−
³
N
φπθ
´ 1
φ−1
, (15)
where N is given by (9) and pθ is given by
pθ = cθ +
µ
N
φ
¶
γθ
qθ
. (16)
Proof. The equilibrium advertised price distribution is given from the relation (14) as
F (p, θ)=
N
nθ
Ã
1−
µ
N
φπθ
bθ − cθ
p− cθ
¶ 1
φ−1
!
.
Recalling that nθN = 1−
³
N
φπθ
´ 1
φ−1
from (6), we can write (15). It is readily checked that F (bθ, θ) = 1.
Since F
¡
pθ, θ
¢
= 0, the lowest price in sector θ is determined by (14) as:
¡
pθ − cθ
¢
=
(bθ − cθ)
πθ
N
φ
. (17)
Then (16) follows immediately. The corresponding density, f (p, θ) is strictly positive on
£
pθ, bθ
¤
, where it is
decreasing and convex (as shown by diﬀerentiation of (15)).
The distribution for sector θ depends on the other sectors through N , giving a simple general equilibrium
eﬀect. For given N , we can derive the price distributions by sector independently; since consumer surpluses
by sector are additively separable and consumers are not budget constrained.
The intuition for the lowest price in the support is straightforward. A message sent at this lowest price
always beats all the other messages from the sector. Hence the sales probability is just the probability that
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it is read at all, which is simply φN since it has φ shots from a pool of N messages. Equating this probability
times the mark-up to the cost of sending the message gives (16).
As in Butters (1977), lower prices are advertised more heavily. In the Butters model (with qθ = 1), the
corresponding lowest price, p, would be simply cθ+γθ, because such a price just covers the cost of production
plus sending the message. In the Butters version, the lowest price must always get a sale because there is
no information congestion, and no possibility that the message remains unread. In contrast, here the lowest
price in any sector does not always make a sale. Information overßow pushes up the lowest price in the
support, which is needed to compensate for the likelihood that the message may not be received.
The simplest measure of price dispersion is the breadth of the support of the equilibrium prices. This is
bθ − pθ, where pθ = cθ +
³
N
φ
´
γθ
qθ
. Ceteris paribus, dispersion is smaller the greater is
³
N
φ
´
γθ
qθ
(recall though
that N depends on all the parameters of the model, apart from the inactive sectors proÞtabilities). Hence,
for example, a larger γθ decreases N and so increases dispersion in all unaﬀected sectors, while decreasing
dispersion in the aﬀected sector (see (9)).
Changes within the sector aﬀect the support as well as the aggregate message volume N . A sector
can become inviable if it faces tough competition from other sectors and/or it is quite unattractive itself.
Viability can be expressed as the condition that the price support does not collapse. That is pθ < bθ. From
(17)), this means that Nφ < πθ; this is the same condition from (6) for nθ > 0 in equilibrium.
Finally, suppose instead that sector θ is associated to a conditional downward-sloping demand and the
consumer will buy qθ (p) units at the lowest price, p, held. Assume that demand begets a quasi-concave
proÞt function with a maximizing price pθ. The corresponding proÞt conditional on being the only message
registered in the sector) is (pθ − cθ) qθ (pθ), and so the proÞt per dollar transmission cost is πθ = (pθ−cθ)qθ(pθ)γθ ,
which therefore plays exactly the same role as does πθ above. In equilibrium, no Þrm will charge more than pθ
because proÞts can be increased by charging pθ, and the parallel analysis to that above yields the equilibrium
price distribution as
F (p, θ)=
1−
³
N
φπθ
´ 1
φ−1
³
(pθ−cθ)qθ(pθ)
(p−cθ)qθ(p)
´ 1
φ−1
1−
³
N
φπθ
´ 1
φ−1
22
(cf. (15)), where N is given by (9) with πθ replacing πθ. Now pθ is given implicitly by
¡
pθ − cθ
¢
qθ
¡
pθ
¢
=³
N
φ
´
γθ (cf. (16)), which has a unique price solution for pθ < pθ under the assumption that proÞt is strictly
quasi-concave.32 Compared to the distribution for rectangular demand (setting pθ = bθ and treating qθ
as invariant), the distribution is now stochastically lower (FOSD) because lower prices are relatively more
attractive due to the demand expansion eﬀect.
4.1 Advertised price dispersion and sector proÞtability
Greater sector proÞtability impacts the aﬀected sector by increasing the volume of messages sent (Proposition
5). As we now see (Proposition 9), this increases price competition, and so stochastically lowers prices.
However, this market mechanism spills over into the other sectors. Elsewhere, price competition is reduced
because sector messages are crowded out in relative terms. Nonetheless, the number of messages sent in
other sectors can actually rise (see Proposition 7) because the reduced price competition can raise proÞts
per Þrm (which then must be reduced by further entry).
Proposition 9 An increase in the proÞtability, πθ, of one sector decreases prices (and increases the support
of price dispersion) in that sector and increases prices (and decreases the support of price dispersion) in the
other sectors, in the sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance. A proportional increase in the attractivity
of all sectors leaves the price distribution unchanged.
Proof. Recall F (p, θ)=
1−
³
N
φπθ
´ 1
φ−1
³
bθ−cθ
p−cθ
´ 1
φ−1
1−
³
N
φπθ
´ 1
φ−1
by (15). Hence dFdπθ0 (for θ
0 6= θ) has the opposite sign
from dNdπθ0 , which is positive, as already established. Hence F (p, θ) decreases in πθ
0 . However, dFdπθ has the
opposite sign, since Nπθ is decreasing in πθ (from (9)). Hence, F (p, θ) increases in πθ. If πθ increases, pθ
falls; if πθ0 increases, N rises so that pθ rises (see (16)). If all sectors increase proportionately in attractivity,
N
πθ
is unchanged (by the homogeneity in Proposition 5) and so F (p, θ) is unchanged.
This means that advertised prices (and price dispersion) can be negatively correlated across sectors. If
one sector becomes more desirable (in the sense of higher surplus), prices fall in that sector as competition
intensiÞes. But the additional messages crowd out messages in other sectors, and this relaxes competition
32Otherwise, the support of the price distribution will have a gap for prices such that proÞt is no lower at a lower price.
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in those other sectors. On the other hand, across-the-board changes aﬀecting all sectors can leave prices the
same. This property underlies the result in the next Section that proportionately lower message transmission
cost savings are dissipated fully: equivalently, a (proportional) tax might be raised without deadweight loss.
The sales price distribution diﬀers from the advertised price distribution because lower prices are more
likely to get sales, and also because even the lowest advertised price does not always make a sale. It is
derived in the on-line version of the paper. We now follow through with the analysis of the symmetric case.
4.2 Dispersion and symmetric sectors
In the symmetric case, N is given by (12) as N = φ
³
Θ¯−1
Θ¯
´φ−1
π, and so the cumulative distribution function
for advertised prices (15) becomes
F (p, θ)=Θ¯
Ã
1− Θ¯− 1
Θ¯
µ
b− c
p− c
¶ 1
φ−1
!
, for p ∈ £p, b¤ , (18)
where p = c +
³
Θ¯−1
Θ¯
´φ−1
(b− c) (by (16)). Hence, as φ rises, the lower bound p falls, and so intra-sector
competition rises in this respect. A tighter characterization is quite immediate.
Proposition 10 Assume sectors are symmetric. A higher attention span, φ, lowers prices in the sense of
First-Order Stochastic Dominance.
Proof. From (18), F (p, θ, φ2) > F (p, θ, φ1) as
³
b−c
p−c
´ 1
φ2−1
<
³
b−c
p−c
´ 1
φ1−1 , or φ1 < φ2.
Lower prices as attention goes up underpins the earlier comparative static results of the information
hump. Even though the total message volume is not monotone (see Figure 2), the price eﬀect is. For low φ,
prices are high and few messages are sent: for high φ, prices are low and few messages are sent. In the Þrst
case, because few messages are registered, Þrms may as well set high prices and chance the low probability
of another message from the same sector. In the second case, price competition intensiÞes because there is
a strong likelihood another message from the same sector will be read.
Along similar lines, it is readily shown that higher Θ¯ stochastically increases prices (with more price
dispersion). This is because the limited attention is more divided. We now turn to the normative analysis.
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5 Normative properties
We Þrst undertake a welfare analysis of the performance of the market equilibrium and emphasis the excess
of information. In the following two sub-sections we consider cost changes and transmission taxes - even cost
increases without any corresponding revenue collection can improve the allocation. These results stress the
extent of the market failure, and also help indicate which sectors are particularly responsible.
One strong property of the Butters (1977) model is that the market allocation is optimal. However,
this property crucially depends on his assumption that each message hits somewhere.33 In our set-up, there
is rent dissipation and socially wasteful duplication of messages.34 Competition for attention imposes a
congestion externality which leads to excessive advertising: this feature is perhaps more in tune (rather than
optimality or under-advertising) with ones personal reaction to advertising clutter.
The welfare function is given by summing over sectors the total sector surplus times the probability a
sale is made in the sector, and then subtracting the message costs. DeÞne
Q (nθ, N) = 1−
³
1− nθ
N
´φ
. (19)
as the probability that there is at least one hit in sector θ: the probability that each of the nθ messages is
missed on each of the φ draws. Notice that
∂Q (nθ, N)
∂nθ
= Pθ. (20)
Thus the increased chance of discovering a sector when an extra message is sent is the probability that the
extra message is registered when no other message from the sector has registered. We can write the welfare
function (for any values nθ ≥ 0, θ = 1, ..., Θ¯) as35
W (n1, ..., nΘ¯;N) =
XΘ¯
θ=1
[(bθ − cθ) qθQ (nθ,N)− γθnθ] , (21)
where N =
XΘ¯
θ=1
nθ. This form (breaking out N as a separate argument) is convenient for what follows.
33 It also depends on the rectangular demand assumption. Stegeman (1991) shows that there is insuﬃcient advertising if
demand slopes down, because Þrms do not internalize the consumer surplus of lower prices.
34Clearly the Þrst best optimum comprises one message per sector, and the active sectors should be the φ for which the proÞt
per message, (bθ − cθ) qθ − γθ, is highest. If γ is the same for all θ, these are the Þrst φ ones, those for which πθ is highest.
35When it comes later to including tax revenues, all we will need to assume is that they have some social value.
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Lemma 11 The social beneÞt from an extra message in sector θ is equal to
dW
dnθ
=
∂W
∂nθ
+
∂W
∂N
= ((bθ − cθ) qθPθ − γθ) +
∂W
∂N
, (22)
where the RHS terms are private sector proÞt and congestion externality respectively.
Proof. From (21), we have dWdnθ =
∂W
∂nθ
+ ∂W∂N
dN
dnθ
: noting that dNdnθ = 1 (message anonymity) gives the Þrst
inequality in (22). Now, from (21) and (19), and then using (20), we have that
∂W
∂nθ
= (bθ − cθ) qθ ∂Q (nθ,N)
∂nθ
− γθ (23)
= (bθ − cθ) qθPθ − γθ.
This expression is the proÞt of a Þrm setting the top price in active sector θ ≤ Θ given nθ messages
emanating from the sector (see (5)). Since this is zero in equilibrium, the remaining term, ∂W/∂N , is
naturally interpreted as the congestion externality from active sectors.
The next result shows the externality is negative, and quantiÞes it at the equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 12 The total number of messages transmitted is excessive in equilibrium, and the (negative)
congestion externality is measured as the average transmission cost, 1Ne
XΘ
θ=1
γθn
e
θ.
Proof. Recall that dWdnθ =
∂W
∂nθ
+ ∂W∂N , and
∂W (ne,Ne)
∂nθ
= 0 (where the superscript e denotes that the variable
is evaluated at its equilibrium value) by the zero proÞt condition of equilibrium for all active θ. Then we
have that dW (n
e,Ne)
dnθ
= ∂W (n
e,Ne)
∂N . From (21), we have for active sectors
∂W (n,N)
∂N
=
XΘ
θ=1
(bθ − cθ) qθ dQ (nθ, N)
dN
(24)
= −
XΘ
θ=1
(bθ − cθ) qθ nθ
N
Pθ.
Using the zero proÞt condition (3) we get
∂W (ne, Ne)
∂N
= − 1
Ne
XΘ
θ=1
γθn
e
θ < 0, (25)
i.e., the congestion externality is strictly negative and equal to (minus) the average transmission cost.
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This result underscores the main problem with the market equilibrium: although (as we show next) the
allocation is (second-best) optimal across sectors given the total equilibrium message volume, the overall
volume is excessive. This is seen clearly from what we just argued in Lemma 11, namely that ∂W (n
e,Ne)
∂nθ
= 0
(i.e., evaluated at the equilibrium), while dW (n
e,Ne)
dN < 0. However, while optimal and private incentives
are aligned in terms of allocation, the private choice ignores the message crowding externality on all other
sectors, which is measured by ∂W (n
e,Ne)
∂N < 0. This implies excessive messages are sent. The social cost of an
extra message, as per (25), is the average sending cost. This relation holds because if extra messages have to
be sent, they should be allocated across sectors in proportion to the sector representation in the population:
one more message therefore costs the average transmission cost.
Proposition 13 The equilibrium allocation of messages across sectors is socially optimal given the number
of messages transmitted at the equilibrium.
This is proved in the Appendix. The key feature that generates the optimality result is (20): the marginal
change in the choice probability holding Þxed the total number of messages, ∂Q(nθ,N)∂nθ , which is crucial to
the social problem, is equal to the probability Pθ that the highest-priced Þrm makes a sale in the private
problem. The equivalence holds because the probability that an extra message is examined and nothing else
was examined from the sector reßects both its social contribution and the private incentive for sending it.
5.1 Increasing transmission costs uniformly
We Þrst establish a strong neutrality result for across-the-board cost changes. Uniform transmission cost
decreases raise advertising levels (and industry sizes) proportionately, and so are a strong driver for increased
information, but they do not aﬀect the real outcome. Indeed, the economics of lower transmission rates are
the economics of rent dissipation. Halving the cost in each sector simply doubles the number of ads sent per
sector. The intuition comes from the fact that both N and nθ are homogeneous of degree minus one. The
sector choice probabilities (nθ/N) are then homogeneous of degree zero in the percentage cost increase. The
advertised price distribution, F (p, θ) is then also independent of such cost changes. This also explains why
no sectors enter in the face of a common cost increase: halving transmission costs also halves the chance the
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highest priced sender makes a sale (since it faces twice the competition). Because optimal taxes are positive,
we phrase the next proposition in terms of a cost rise.
Proposition 14 A uniform percentage increase in transmission costs leaves welfare unchanged. Hence a
uniform percentage tax raises welfare. Price dispersion remains unchanged, as does the fraction of messages
sent per sector, while the number of messages per sector (and therefore the total) goes down in proportion to
the percentage cost increase. The number of active sectors remains the same.
Proof. A common percentage transmission cost increase, s, raises each γθ to γθ (1 + s) and so reduces
each πθ proportionately to πθ1+s . From (9), such a common cost increase means N (s) (1 + s) is constant,
where N (s) is the equilibrium aggregate message volume under common cost increase s. Equivalently, the
original N (0) falls to N (s) = N(0)1+s . Recall
nθ
N = 1−
³
1
φ
N
πθ
´ 1
φ−1
from (6). Since the ratio Nπθ (on the RHS) is
unaltered by the cost increase, then so is the ratio nθN (on the LHS). Likewise, since
N
πθ
is unchanged, the price
support and the cumulative price distribution stay the same. Recall that a sector is active iﬀ (bθ − cθ) qθ φN >
γθ. With a common cost increase s, the condition becomes (bθ − cθ) qθ φN(s) > γθ (1 + s). However, since
N (s) (1 + s) = N (0), the condition remains unaltered. Consumer welfare therefore is unchanged, proÞts
remain zero, and so welfare remains unchanged. The tax result is an immediate corollary.
If tax revenues were discarded, a tax would have no eﬀect on welfare. Any tax not lost in the collection
is therefore a social gain, and gets transferred purely from costs. Since proÞts are zero, consumers are just
as well oﬀ since they face the same situation (same distributions, but fewer overall messages). The tax is
therefore raised without deadweight loss.
Proposition 13 showed that the base allocation of messages was optimal for the equilibrium message vol-
ume, Ne. By Proposition 14, an equal percentage tax on transmission scales back messages proportionately.
However, unless transmission costs are the same across sectors, the scaled-back message levels induced by a
non-negligible tax are not optimal for the new (given) total volume of messages. Indeed, the partial welfare
derivative (23) is ∂W (n,N)∂nθ = (bθ − cθ) qθPθ − γθ, which expression still holds in the presence of a tax which
is fully redistributed back to consumers (although the arguments in Pθ are proportionately smaller). These
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partial derivatives are still to be equalized across sectors at any constrained optimal allocation for given Ne.
However, the market equilibrium condition in the presence of a proportional tax, τ , on transmission becomes
(bθ − cθ) qθPθ = γθ (1 + τ). Substituting,
∂W (ne, Ne)
∂nθ
= τγθ. (26)
This means that the allocation is constrained optimal (all the ∂W (ne,Ne) /∂nθ are equal) either if τ = 0
(where we evaluated the earlier welfare derivative), or if all the transmission costs, γθ, are equal. Otherwise,
ramping up the transmission cost with a tax causes an allocative distortion: from (26), the higher-cost
messages ought to be provided more (and the lower-cost ones less). This means that the cheaper messages
tend to be overused in equilibrium (in the presence of the tax). These are the ones associated with the most
dissipation, ceteris paribus.
This suggests that the low transmission-cost sectors are over-represented in the population of messages
(in the sense that they ought to be scaled back more than proportionately). Although the proportional tax
does not eﬀect choice probabilities, the fact that the allocation is no longer optimal if transmission costs are
diﬀerent means that the optimal tax (given a target N) is not a proportional one. Instead, the optimal tax
should fall more heavily on the cheaper message communications: from (26), the sector-speciÞc tax rate that
ensures all sectors have the same marginal social beneÞt entails τθ inversely proportional to γθ.
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5.2 SpeciÞc cost increases
Proposition 13 suggests that low transmission-cost sectors do not inßict more damage on high transmission-
cost ones, or vice versa, at equilibrium. All sectors are in excess, but no group should be singled out.
This result leads us to ask whether a deterioration in a sector - say an increase in the sectors sending
cost (like a tax with the proceeds discarded) - can reduce welfare. As we shall show, such an increase cannot
help if all sectors are the same, but it can if they are suﬃciently asymmetric. Loosely, cost increases may
help on sectors with low transmission costs (relative to surplus) and those with low surpluses.
36 Indeed, the Þrst-best optimum entails just one message per sector, which also suggests more than proportional scaling back
through taxes of low-cost sectors. Low-cost sectors are also the sectors with small tax raised per message: the high-cost sectors
have the additional social beneÞt of larger tax revenue per message.
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Proposition 15 Welfare can rise when transmission costs increase in sectors with low proÞtability or with
low transmission costs. Hence welfare rises from a transmission tax on such sectors.
Proof. From (21), and since ∂W∂nθ0 = 0 at equilibrium for active sectors, the relevant welfare derivative is
dW
dγθ
= −nθ + ∂W
∂N
dN
dγθ
.
This expression indicates that there is a trade-oﬀ. From (25), ∂W∂N = − 1N
XΘ
θ0=1
nθ0γθ0 ; from (9), we have
dN
dγθ
= −N 1γθ
1
Θ
χθ
χ¯ , where we recall that χ¯ is the average value of χθ =
³
1
πθ
´ 1
φ−1
. Pulling these expressions
together, the derivative condition is:
dW
dγθ
= −nθ + 1
γθ
1
Θ
χθ
χ¯
XΘ
θ0=1
nθ0γθ0 .
Under symmetry, a rise in one sectors transmission costs has no eﬀect at the margin, since dW/dγθ = 0.
To deal with asymmetric sectors, it helps to rewrite the above expression as
dW
dγθ
s
=
−nθγθXΘ
θ0=1
nθ0γθ0
Á
Θ
+
χθ
χ¯
= −Γθ
Γ¯
+
χθ
χ¯
, (27)
where Γθ = nθγθ is the aggregate transmission cost for sector θ, and Γ¯ is the average of these. (27) shows that
it will typically be beneÞcial to increase costs on some sectors: the two eﬀects in dWdγθ go in diﬀerent directions.
Consider two special cases. First, suppose that two sectors have the same transmission cost, and one is more
proÞtable than the other, so it also has a higher equilibrium industry size (number of messages). Then Γθ
is smaller for the less proÞtable one, and χθ is larger, so
dW
dγθ
is larger for the less proÞtable one. Second,
suppose that two sectors are equally proÞtable, so they have the same equilibrium industry size (number of
messages). If one has a higher transmission cost than the other, its Γθ is larger, and so dWdγθ is smaller.
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Thus, higher transmission costs are beneÞcial, ceteris paribus, in less proÞtable or in low transmission cost
sectors. The tax result is an immediate corollary.
The analysis of this sub-section indicates the low-proÞt products and those with low transmission costs
as being socially harmful. This holds despite them having a small foothold: one might have otherwise
37This is because a cost increase in the sector with the larger transmission cost has a relatively smaller eﬀect: proÞt is not
changed much so there is little reduction in congestion, but the higher cost is borne over a large market base. The same cost
increase in the smaller cost sector has a larger eﬀect on proÞt, πθ, and so causes a much larger reduction in message congestion,
while being borne over a smaller base since the sector contracts more.
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suspected high-proÞt products because they are responsible for the most crowding. The previous subsection
also points the Þnger at low transmission-cost products as being over-represented when all messages are
scaled back proportionately by a proportional tax. Thus these results take diﬀerent perspectives on the
blame issue, but reach similar conclusions.
6 Distractions
The strong neutrality property of Proposition 14, that uniform cost changes have no real eﬀects, relies
critically on the lack of outside competition for attention, which also implies the homogeneity property in
(9). One natural way to relax this property is to introduce another source of competition for attention. This
amendment retains a basic CES form and the broad comparative static properties, but now implies that
transmission cost changes have real eﬀects: a lower cost increases the likelihood of Þnding any sector, and
decreases prices. However, taxing messages remains optimal.
Think of consumers as having a limited amount of time, or a limited attention span. They cannot
process all the information coming at them. Jostling with the price of MicroSoft Word or a supermarket
ßyer for pork chops is a really important email from a Dean or a crying child. We model this outside
competition for attention as further distractions to attention. Formally, suppose there are n0 (exogenous)
other messages (or activities) which compete for attention along with the advertising messages. Hence now
we have N =
XΘ¯
θ=0
nθ. We associate an exogenous social value π0 > 0 to outside each message (or activity)
examined (the positive value reßects the fact that the individual allows herself to be distracted).
6.1 Message volume with distractions
With distractions, it is still true that each active sectors message share is nθN = 1−
³
N
φ
1
πθ
´ 1
φ−1
, θ = 1, ..., Θ
(see (6)). However, to Þnd the total number of messages, N , now means adding in the outside sector, so the
earlier CES form is amended to yield the implicit form:
N = n0 +N
XΘ
θ=1
Ã
1−
µ
N
φ
1
πθ
¶ 1
φ−1
!
.
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Writing this out, we have a quasi-CES form
n0 +N
³
Θ− 1
´
= N
φ
φ−1
XΘ
θ=1
µ
1
φ
1
πθ
¶ 1
φ−1
. (28)
The LHS is linear in N (with a positive intercept), and the RHS is convex (and starts at 0), so that there
is one intersection with N > 0, which is thus the unique solution. The comparative static properties of the
equilibrium are quite simple, and concur with previous results. One new one: a higher value of n0 leads to
a higher N , and nθ falls in all other sectors.
However, now there is a real eﬀect of uniform cost changes. To see this, suppose that γθ falls to γθ (1 + s)
for all θ > 0 (with s < 0). Then (28) becomes n0N +
³
Θ− 1
´
= (N (1 + s))
1
φ−1
XΘ
θ=1
³
1
φ
1
πθ
´ 1
φ−1
, and clearly
N rises when s falls. From the same equation, a higher N also entails a lower value of N (1 + s). This means
that a lower cost per message now raises the number of messages less than proportionately. From (6), each
active sectors share of the larger message total is bigger, as well as being larger in absolute terms. This is
reßected too in the equilibrium price distribution: from (15) and the arguments of Proposition 9, noting that
N/π0 rises, the lower cost decreases prices (in the sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance).
6.2 Welfare analysis
We Þrst show that there is still the right allocation of N (cf. Proposition 13), but too many messages. The
welfare function is now written as
W =
XΘ¯
θ=1
[(bθ − cθ) qθQθ − γθn (θ)] + n0π0
φ
N
, (29)
where n0 distractions vie for the attention span of φ given N total competitors. The proof follows the lines
of the earlier one. For any given N , the partial derivative marginal beneÞt expressions (which are to be
equalized across all sectors in the second-best problem of choosing the optimal allocation of N messages)
are the same as those given before, and hence the equilibrium still has the right allocation of the messages
across sectors, but too many messages (given π0 > 0).
We already showed a uniform cost increase reduces the number of messages, and has real eﬀects which
harm consumers since prices rise. Nonetheless, we now show a uniform percentage tax on all sectors (except
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the untaxed sector, n0) still raises welfare. From (29), the eﬀect of a tax is dWdτ =
XΘ
θ=1
∂W
∂nθ
dnθ
dτ +
∂W
∂N
dN
dτ .
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Evaluating at τ = 0 yields again the result that the equilibrium entails, ∂W∂nθ = 0, where the zero comes from
the zero proÞt condition, as seen before. Hence, dWdτ =
∂W
∂N
dN
dτ , and we know
dN
dτ < 0. Also,
∂W
∂N < 0 since
each Qθ term is decreasing in N and the additional term, n0π0 φN , is decreasing in N (given that π0 > 0).
Hence welfare increases locally from a uniform percentage tax. Here, a tax has the additional social beneÞt
of rendering more prominent the distractions.
7 Conclusions
The Information Age is characterized by a surfeit of information sent at relatively low cost. Modern economies
involve many media which can be used to catch the attention of prospective consumers, so the attention
span of consumers is likely larger than ever before. Yet modern economies also involve many product classes.
These factors interact to determine information congestion and the consequent degree of competitiveness of
sectors, as reßected in the degree of price dispersion. Below we bring together some of the key comparative
static properties and how they are transmitted.
First, new product classes may displace others by crowding information spans. As proÞtable new op-
portunities arise, or as the cost of communicating them through new media falls, less proÞtable classes are
displaced. Total information volume rises, and new (or improved) sectors carve out advertising market shares
at the expense of the others. Nevertheless, suﬃciently strong other sectors may see a rise in size because
crowding relaxes price competition leading to stochastically higher prices. This encourages messages when
the enhanced proÞt eﬀect dominates the direct crowding eﬀect.
Second, ceteris paribus, increasing the number of product classes causes an initial acceleration in the
volume of messages as crowding raises prices making more ads proÞtable. Eventually this tails oﬀ, in a
classic S-shaped (logistic) volume relation over time, with an upper bound to message volume.
Third, if consumer attention rises, prices fall stochastically as competition is enhanced. This gives rise to
the Information Hump: information volume initially rises as it becomes easier to get messages across. But
38The welfare function(29) is written in terms of real resource costs and beneÞts: implicitly, any tax raised from suppliers is
being redistributed to consumers with unit marginal utility of money.
33
the lower prices eventually come to dominate as it becomes less proÞtable to send messages as it is likely that
other oﬀers register with the consumer. This suggests that both more attention and more product classes
raise the volume of information. Eventually though the attention span eﬀect reduces information volume and
increases competition. Thus, whether prices get lower depends crucially on whether attention rises faster
than the range of (desirable) goods.
The model borrows heavily from Butters (1977) in using a zero-proÞt condition to derive equilibrium
price distributions. But it diﬀers in key respects in assumptions and conclusions. While Butters model
assumes that each message is read by some consumer, here some messages are lost because they are not
read at all. We stress too the competition for attention across sectors, which gives rise to cross-sector eﬀects
in pricing and message volume. While Butters Þnds that the overall level of advertising is optimal, we have
too much advertising, though a constrained optimality result is retained in the sense that the allocation
across sectors is optimal, given the equilibrium message level.
The intuition for our optimal allocation of ads across sectors, given the total (excessive) volume, is as
follows. First, the congestion externality of the overall ad level is the same regardless of which sector sends an
extra ad (the term ∂W/∂N in the normative analysis). Second, the individual sector contribution to welfare
from an extra ad is the probability it is seen, weighted by its social contribution, from which is subtracted
the sending cost. As with the Butters model, this is the proÞt of the top Þrm, and so is zero for all sectors.
The model delivers a detailed picture of equilibrium price distributions across asymmetric sectors com-
peting for attention. Equilibrium message ratios are shown to obey an inverse IIA property. The equilibrium
total volume of advertising messages is a CES function of the individual sectors proÞtability measures. This
constitutes a novel derivation of such a CES function, and is instrumental in delivering sharp predictions.
A CES form is still central when we allow for distractions to the attention paid to ads. This device
relaxes the homogeneity property that proportional decreases in communication costs raise ad levels pro-
portionately, and gives rise to a modiÞed CES form for ad levels, whereby lower costs across the board now
may cause weaker sectors to exit. However, a tax on ads still raises welfare despite the introduction of an
untaxed sector (there is still over-advertising), and the allocation of ads across sector is still optimal under
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the constraint of the equilibrium total volume of messages.
Some caveats to the analysis constitute further extensions. The model is one of Þrms seeking (passive)
consumers through ads, which can be thought of as the pure Couch Potato model. The converse case has
consumers seeking opportunities through search. Indeed, both sides can be active, as in Baye and Morgan
(2001). One step in this direction is to allow the attention span to be endogenously determined by equating
the expected surplus from an extra ad to the marginal cost of paying more attention: the current speciÞcation
can be viewed as a simple version of this with prohibitive marginal cost at φ.
The model also views all media as equally delivering messages for attention, and is not immediately
equipped to deal with which messages might be better suited to which media. Nor indeed is media pricing
of message delivery given much shrift, though this is the topic of the (platform) economics of broadcasting.
Instead, perhaps like billboards, web-sites and bulk mail, access price is exogenous. The crucial marketing
dimension of targeting of messages to consumers (for example through the use of speciÞc media) has been
closed down through the device of a single representative consumer. Likewise, messages are assumed to be
sampled randomly, so there is no allowance for the consumer to pay more attention to particular message
types or Þlter out others. Information congestion and the Economics of Attention have yet to be fully ßeshed
out in these broader directions.
8 Appendix
8.1 A. Comparison to Butters model
Butters (1977) supposes M consumers, and a single sending sector (so we can suppress the subscript θ in
what follows). Letters are sent randomly, and each message reaches only a single consumer (ours potentially
reach all consumers). Consumers examine all the messages received, and each buys at the lowest price
received. As with our model, the equilibrium price support has no atoms, no holes, and runs up to b. It
starts at c+ γ, because a message at that price is surely read by whoever receives it, and it is a winner (in
our model, it must start higher because even the best deal may be unread).
We follow Butters in equating the probability of a sale from two diﬀerent perspectives. The Þrst is the
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zero proÞt condition, P = γp−c . The second is the Þnding probability for the price p. For the price b, the
likelihood of Þnding an empty letter box (the only way for the highest price to make a sale) must therefore
equal γb−c . This is thus the fraction of the market unserved, and so is a key statistic in comparing equilibrium
to optimum.
The corresponding welfare function is W = (b − c)MΛ − γN if N messages are sent, where Λ is the
fraction of consumers informed. Hence the optimal number of ads is determined from (b− c)M dΛdN − γ:
this equation suggests that an exponential form for the probability of Þnding an empty letterbox will give
equivalence with the equilibrium. This remark underscores the formulation of Butters letterbox technology.
To derive this, note that the probability that at least one of N letters sent reaches a particular one of the
M letterboxes is 1 − ¡1− 1M ¢N . When M is large, this is approximately 1 − exp (−N/M) (= Λ). Hence,
dΛ
dN =
1
M exp (−N/M) = 1M (1− Λ), from which it follows that the number of uninformed at the optimum is
Mγ
b−c , the same as in equilibrium.
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Finally, consider the equilibrium advertised price distribution in the Butters model. Let the number of
letters priced below p be A(p) (which therefore replaces N in the logic of the previous paragraph). Hence
the probability of a letter missing all lower-priced letters in a mailbox is exp (−A (p) /M) which must equal
γ
p−c by the zero proÞt condition. The form of A (p) and its properties (decreasing, concave) follow directly.
8.2 B. Proof of Proposition 13
Let N be given at the equilibrium level stipulated by (9), that we denote as Ne, and we wish to show that
the division of these messages eﬀectuated in equilibrium is optimal.
First, note that maximization of W (.) under the constraint that the non-negative nθs sum to a given
value of N is a maximization problem of a continuous function on a compact set and therefore must have a
solution. Therefore at least one of the nθ must be positive: call this sector j.
Second, substituting the constraint nj = N −
XΘ¯
θ 6=j nθ into W (n1, ., nj , ., nΘ¯;N) enables us to write the
maximand as W (n1, ., [nj ] , .., nΘ¯;N), and we now show that W (.) is concave in the arguments n1, ., [nj ] , .., nΘ¯
39The interpretation is that the business stealing and consumer surplus appropriation externalities net out.
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(for given N), where the notation [nj ] denotes that the corresponding argument, nj , is excluded. Indeed,
W (n1, ., [nj ] , .., nΘ¯;N) = (bj − cj) qjQ
µ
N −
XΘ¯
θ 6=j nθ, N
¶
− γj
µ
N −
XΘ¯
θ 6=j nθ
¶
+
XΘ¯
θ 6=j [(bθ − cθ) qθQ (nθ, N)− γθnθ] .
Recall that the sum of concave functions is concave. The terms in the transmission costs γ are linear in
n1, ., [nj ] , .., nΘ¯, while for θ 6= j, the Q (nθ, N) terms are concave in own nθ. There remains the term
Q
µ
N −
XΘ¯
θ 6=j nθ,N
¶
= 1 −
⎛⎝XΘ¯θ 6=j nθ
N
⎞⎠φ (by deÞnition (19)): the summation term is linear in the nθ,
given N ; hence raising this to a power φ > 1 gives a convex function, and one minus a convex function is
concave, as desired.
Third, since W (.) is concave, and is maximized over a compact and convex set, it has a unique max-
imal value. Let a solution be denoted
©
no1, ..,
£
noj
¤
, .., no
Θ¯
ª ≥ 0, with noj = Ne −XΘ¯θ 6=j noθ, and let©
µo1, ..,
£
µoj
¤
, .., µo
Θ¯
ª ≥ 0 be the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers. The solution maximizes W if and
only if
©
no1, .,
£
noj
¤
, .., no
Θ¯
;µo1, .,
£
µoj
¤
, .., µo
Θ¯
ª
solves the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. This means that:
∂ W
∂nθ
=
½
= 0 if noθ > 0,
≤ 0 if noθ = 0.
By (23) we have ∂ W∂nθ = ((bθ − cθ) qθPθ − γθ)−
¡
(bj − cj) qjPj − γj
¢
. Therefore
((bθ − cθ) qθPθ − γθ)
½
=
¡
(bj − cj) qjPj − γj
¢
if noθ > 0,
≤ ¡(bj − cj) qjPj − γj¢ if noθ = 0. (30)
By the zero proÞt condition for active Þrms (3), (bθ − cθ) qθPθ = γθ if nθ > 0; but (bθ − cθ) qθPθ ≤ γθ for
inactive sectors (see (4)). This means that the market allocation solves (30), and so induces the maximal
W (.) and hence the maximal W (.) under the constraint. In other words, as per (23), ∂W∂nθ = 0 by the zero
proÞt condition for the highest-priced sender in sector θ, and so the equalization condition is guaranteed at
the equilibrium Ne.
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